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Protecting organizational information assets is an 
essential objective for most organizations. More than 
ever, information security relies on insiders with 
access to information in their work. This research 
integrates regulatory focus theory with rational choice 
theory to help shed light on these insiders’ motivations 
to protect organizational information. The result of 
these exploratory analyses indicates that promotion 
and prevention foci each distinctly relate to perceived 
costs and benefits of protecting organizational 
information assets. Additionally, the findings show 
that the overall benefit of protecting mediates an 
expanded set of costs and benefits. Ultimately, the 
model explains 57.1% of the variance in insiders’ 
intentions to protect organizational information 
assets.  
1. Introduction
Protecting sensitive information and information 
systems (IS) is a crucial task for many organizations. 
Today, organizational insiders (or simply insiders) 
have new responsibilities to ensure the security of 
organizational information and IS [5]. These insiders 
are all agents of the firm with access to information 
and IS [38]. Because insiders are entrusted with 
organizational information to complete any of a 
number of job roles and work-related tasks, their 
behaviors with this information are of paramount 
importance for information security [37, 12, 16]. 
Therefore, understanding how insiders make security-
related decisions becomes an essential goal of IS 
security researchers [32].  
Many theoretical perspectives have been examined 
to help understand insider security-related behavior. 
Underlying many of these prior studies [e.g., 43, 4, 47, 
10] are the mechanisms by which individuals weigh
the consequences of their decisions. One theory that
helps explain human decision-making is rational
choice theory (RCT) [13]. RCT’s core philosophy is
somewhat simple: people are utility seeking agents
that make decisions based on their evaluation of the
benefits and costs of their choices [4]. Essentially, this
means that individuals weigh the benefits and the costs 
associated with behavior when forming their 
intentions [39]. 
As exhibited by the large body of literature, based, 
at least in part, on rational choice theory, calculating 
costs and benefits of security-related behavior can be 
influenced by many factors. For example, several 
studies have considered the influence of 
organizational sanctions [e.g., 25, 15], security threat 
severity [e.g., 26, 6, 42], and both negative and 
positive emotional reactions to confronting security 
threats [e.g., 8, 14, 21].  
Despite these significant advances in our 
understanding of insiders’ security-related behaviors, 
researchers continue to call for broader theoretical 
consideration of these issues [48, 32, 27, 36]. 
Additionally, much of the prior research has examined 
RCT in the context of policy compliance [e.g., 4]. 
While this is an important area or investigation for IS 
security, research indicates that the motives to comply 
and protect are distinct [7]. Thus, we contend that a 
candidate for further theoretical extension of rational 
choices and security-related behavior is integration 
with regulatory focus theory (RFT) [19] to examine 
motivations to protect organizational information 
assets.  
Although RFT has been examined by behavioral 
and organizational theorists across many contexts, it 
has not been widely studied in the context of 
information security [30]. RFT posits that individuals’ 
motivations can be explained by their promotion or 
prevention focus [19]. The lack of security research 
investigating RFT is somewhat surprising given that a 
significant body of literature deals with both 
preventing [15, 13, 44] and promoting [37, 6, 3] 
various security-related behaviors and organizational 
outcomes.  
Given this opportunity, we set out to perform an 
initial exploration of the relationship of regulatory 
focus, rational choices (i.e., perceptions of the costs 
and benefits), and intentions to protect organizational 
information assets. Distinct from the compliance 
intentions in prior RCT research [e.g., 4], intentions to 
protect go beyond “explicitly defined responsibilities 
incorporating extra-role behaviors that are not 





associated with rewards for performance or 
punishments for inaction” [7, p. 1192]. 
2. Theoretical Background
As noted, this research seeks to integrate two well-
established theories of rational choices (i.e., RCT [4]) 
and regulatory focus (i.e., RFT [19]). RCT explains 
that individuals consider the benefits and costs of a 
course of action to determine their behavior [4]. RFT 
posits that individuals’ motivations can further be 
explained by their promotion or prevention focus [19]. 
We contend that these theories are complementary 
because the emphasis on promotion or prevention 
likely influences the perceptions of costs and benefits 
associated with a behavior. For example, prior 
research distinguishes motivations to protect from 
motivations to comply [7]. Similarly, the drive to 
proactively protect the firm from security threats may 
be distinct from that to prevent a lapse in security. 
Thus, a prevention-oriented focus might influence 
perceptions of costs, while a promotion-oriented focus 
might influence perceptions of benefits.  
Next, we provide a more detailed background into 
our focal theories. Figure 2 exhibits our research 
model and the theoretical integration of RCT and RFT. 
2.1 Rational Choice Theory 
RCT reflects an individual’s perceptions of the 
balance between the costs and benefits of a course of 
action [4]. At its core, RCT seeks to explain decision 
making of so-called "rational” actors that choose a 
utility-maximizing course of action [1]. Indeed, 
because it accounts for benefits and costs, RCT has 
been widely applied in economics and provides the 
underlying mechanism for many models of 
consumption [17]. As a behavioral choice model, RCT 
has been commonly used in criminology to help 
explain the criminal decision-making process [32].  
Drawing mainly on its criminology roots, IS 
security researchers have also employed RCT to 
understand security policy compliance [4, 10]. For 
example, Bulgurcu et al. [4] examined the benefit of 
compliance, cost of compliance, and cost of non-
compliance with IS security policies to explain policy 
compliance. Others have used a general measure of 
cost-benefit to explain compliance decisions [e.g., 36]. 
2.2. Regulatory Focus Theory 
Regulatory focus theory posits that individuals' 
motivations can be explained by their promotion or 
prevention focus [19]. Promotion focus relates to 
gains, ideals, and accomplishment, and prevention 
focus refers to duties, obligations, and security [22]. 
Thus, promotion focus reflects achievement-oriented 
motivation, while prevention focus reflects an 
avoidance-oriented basis [22]. Depending on the 
organizational or personal objective, promotion or 
prevention focus might provide a more effective 
motivational stimulus [28, 41]. For example, a 
prevention focus often leads to conservative choices, 
while promotion focus is linked to riskier options [2]. 
Interestingly, regulatory focus is at once a 
lingering personality characteristic and a temporary 
state [22]. Despite the clear relevance for IS security 
stemming from the two regulatory approaches, 
relatively little research has examined RFT and IS 
security-related behavior. A notable exception is 
research showing regulatory focus moderates the role 
of punishments (prevention focus) and rewards 
(promotion focus) on insiders' ISP compliance [30]. 
Given that both RFT and RCT distinguish between 
benefits (achievement orientation) and costs 
(avoidance orientation), we contend that a natural 
extension of these seminal theories is to consider them 
together. 
3. Hypotheses
Next, we briefly discuss our hypotheses. Adapting
and extending the prior work of Bulgurcu et al. [4], we 
conceptualize four distinct benefits and costs to 
protecting the information assets: (1) cost of 
protecting, (2) benefit of protecting, (3) cost of not 
protecting, and finally (4) benefit of not protecting. 
While the first of these were adapted directly from the 
prior work, the fourth, the benefit of not protecting, is 
novel to this study. Because this is an exploratory 
work, we are interested in distinguishing the influence 
of promotion and prevention foci on the various costs 
and benefits of protecting information assets. We are 
also the first to formally examine how individual costs 
and benefits of protecting organizational assets 
influence the overall benefit of protecting 
organizational information.  
3.1. Promotion Focus on Benefits and Costs 
Promotion focus is oriented toward achievement. 
Promotion-focused individuals typically employ an 
eagerness strategy framed around the potential for 
gains [41]. However, this reality is complicated 
because some perceived costs result in a security 
benefit. For example, the cost of not protecting works 
counter to not protecting (i.e., it is a motivational force 
that counteracts harmful security behaviors), whereas 
the cost of protecting works as a disincentive to 
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protecting (i.e., it is a motivational force that enhances 
harmful security behaviors). Figure 1 exhibits the 
relationship between the various costs/benefits, and 
their association with an increase/decrease in 
organizational security. 
Figure 1. Costs, Benefits, and Organizational 
Security
At issue is that both regulatory foci are motivational 
frames. Thus, a benefit or a cost can depend on the 
salience of a higher- or lower-order outcome or goal. 
This is similar to the distinction among higher- and 
lower-order effects in other theories used in IS 
research [7, 9]. We hypothesize that a promotion focus 
will be positively related to security-enhancing 
behaviors and negatively associated with harmful 
information security behaviors. 
H1a: Promotion focus will be positively related to 
the benefit of protecting. 
H1b: Promotion focus will be negatively related to 
the benefit of not protecting. 
H1c: Promotion focus will be negatively related to 
the cost of not protecting.  
H1d: Promotion focus will be positively related to 
the cost of not protecting. 
3.2. Prevention Focus on Benefits and Costs 
Prevention focus reflects a motivational tendency 
framed around avoidance of losses. These individuals 
typically employ a vigilance strategy to preserve status 
and avoid losses [41]. As noted above, this is 
complicated by costs and benefits that can influence 
organizational security differently, depending on the 
salience of the goal or outcome. As such, we 
hypothesize that prevention focus will also positively 
relate to security-enhancing behaviors and negatively 
associate with harmful information security behaviors. 
H2a: Prevention focus will be positively related to 
the benefit of protecting. 
H2b: Prevention focus will be negatively related to 
the benefit of not protecting. 
H2c: Prevention focus will be negatively related to 
the cost of protecting. 
H2d: Prevention focus will be positively related to 
cost of not protecting. 
3.3. Individual Costs and Benefits on Overall 
Benefit of Protecting  
Previous researchers have examined the costs and 
benefits of RCT in different ways. For example, 
Bulgurcu et al. [4] examined individual costs and 
benefits, while Moody et al. [36] looked at the overall 
benefit or cost. Interestingly, researchers have not yet 
clarified the relationship between individual costs and 
benefits and the overall cost-benefit balance. 
Additionally, when prior researchers examined costs 
and benefits separately, the benefit of not performing 
the action was excluded [4]. This research gap is 
significant because researchers have found that 
Benefit of Protecting








Cost of Not 
Protecting





Figure 2. Research Model
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motivations exist not to protect one's firm (often 
described as maladaptive rewards) [6, 37]. Thus, we 
hypothesize that the four unique costs and benefits will 
relate to the overall benefit of protecting the 
organization. 
H3: The benefit of protecting will be positively 
related to the overall benefit of protecting 
organizational information assets. 
H4: The benefit of not protecting will be negatively 
related to the overall benefit of protecting 
organizational information assets.  
H5: The cost of protecting will be negatively 
related to the overall benefit of protecting 
organizational information assets.  
H6: Cost of not protecting will be positively 
related to the overall benefit of protecting 
organizational information assets. 
3.4. Overall Benefit of Protecting 
Organizational Information Assets on 
Intentions to Protect Organizational 
Information Assets 
As explained by RCT, the balance between costs 
and benefits helps explain decision making [4]. Thus, 
we hypothesize that the overall benefit of protecting 
organizational information assets will be positively 
related to insiders' intentions to protect these assets.  
H7: Overall benefit of protecting organizational 
information assets will be positively related to 
intentions to protect organizational information 
assets 
4. Study
To examine the integrated model of RCT and RFT, 
we surveyed 295 insiders using an online marketing 
research firm. Our sample represents organizational 
insiders working in a variety of roles across many 
different companies and industries. As recommended 
by researchers, we adapted our measures from 
previous studies whenever possible [45].  




IT position 14.2% 
Management 41.0% 
Bachelor's degree 61% 
Org Size 
    Very large 
 (10,000 or more computers) 
25.1% 
 Large  
 (1,000 to 10,000 computers) 
28.1% 
 Medium  
 (100 to 1,000 computers) 
21.0% 
 Small  
 (1 to 100 computers) 
25.8% 
4.1. Study Measures 
Promotion and prevention were measured using 
scales from Higgins et al. [20]. An item for promotion 
is “I feel like I have made progress toward being 
successful in my life,” and an item for prevention is 
"How often did you obey rules and regulations that 
were established by your parents?”  
The benefits and costs of protecting were measured 
using scales adapted from Bulgurcu et al. [4]. In the 
original scales, these measures captured the benefits 
and costs of compliance. Therefore, we adapted these 
measures to our context of protecting organizational 
information assets. We also extended this prior work 
to include the benefit of not protecting. An example 
item of the benefit of protecting is “My protecting the 
firm from security threats would be favorable to me.” 
Table 2. Construct Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) CR 
Benefit Protecting (1) 0.836 0.939 
Benefit Not Protecting (2) -0.195 0.887 0.959 
Cost Not Protecting (3) 0.541 -0.299 0.890 0.961 
Cost Protecting (4) -0.048 0.345 -0.143 0.777 0.912 
Overall Benefit Protecting (5) 0.468 -0.473 0.497 -0.254 0.629 0.834 
Prevention (6) 0.142 -0.195 0.125 -0.183 0.245 0.573 0.869 
Promotion (7) 0.122 -0.212 0.191 -0.114 0.215 0.095 0.518 0.809 
Protection Intention (8) 0.485 -0.409 0.492 -0.172 0.679 0.206 0.216 0.796 0.921 
CR = Composite Reliability; AVEs on diagonal 
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An example item for the cost of protection is 
“Protecting my firm from information security threats 
is burdensome for me.” An item for the cost of not 
protecting is “My failure to protect my firm from 
information security threats would impact me 
negatively.” Finally, our adapted measure for the 
benefit of not protecting is “My failure to protect my 
firm from information security threats would be 
favorable for me.” 
The overall benefit of protecting construct was 
adapted from Moody et al. [36]. An example item is 
“Overall, my benefits from helping to protect my 
organization from its information security threats 
outweigh the costs.” Finally, the intention to protect 
information assets was taken from Posey et al. [37]. 
An example item is “I intend to protect my 
organization from its information security threats.” 
5. Analysis and Results
We chose the partial least squares-based structural 
equation modeling platform, SmartPLS 3.0 [40] to 
perform our analyses. PLS is appropriate for our study 
because of the exploratory nature of our work [33]. We 
first evaluated the validity of the measures and 
subsequently examined our research model.  
5.1. Construct Validity 
The first criterion we evaluated was the composite 
reliabilities of each of the measures in our model. The 
composite reliabilities were all above 0.70. 
Additionally, all AVEs were above 0.50. Finally, each 
pair of constructs met the Fornell-Larker criterion with 
AVEs greater than squared correlations for every 
construct pair. Table 2 exhibits the construct statistics. 
5.2. Structural Results 
Next, we evaluated the results of the structural 
model. As recommended, we ran the bootstrapping 
algorithm with 5,000 samples to achieve our results 
[18]. Figure 3 exhibits the structural results. Overall, 9 
of the 13 hypothesized relationships were significant 
and in the predicted direction. Moreover, the model 
explains 57.1% of the variance of intentions to protect 
organizational information assets.  
The relationships were all in the direction that 
increases organizational security (see Figure 1). Thus, 
for promotion focus, a positive relationship was found 
with the cost of not protecting, while for prevention 
focus, a negative association with the cost of 
protecting was found. Finally, for both foci, a negative 
relationship was found with the benefit of not 
protecting. 
5.3. Post Hoc Mediation & CMV Analyses 
Beyond merely exploring the direct relationships 
in the research model, we were also interested in 
measuring the indirect and mediated effects present in 
the results. For example, it is instructive to see whether 
the four distinct costs and benefits relate to intentions 
to protect information assets through the overall 
benefit of protecting. Second, we also wanted to 
examine the significance of the relational path from 
Figure 3. Structural Results 
Note: Controls explaining “intentions to protect organizational information assets” 
R2 without controls = 0.461 
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regulatory focus to protection intentions working 
through RCT's costs and benefits.   
To formally test these indirect effects, the bias-
controlled confidence intervals from a bootstrapped 
analysis of 5,000 samples were examined [35, 46]. To 
formally evaluate mediation, we examined the 95% 
confidence interval for each specific indirect effect as 
calculated in SmartPLS 3.0. Where the upper and 
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the 
indirect paths do not contain zero, there is mediation 
[34]. Table 3 exhibits significant indirect/mediated 
relationships. 
Finally, we examined common method variance 
(CMV) using the unmeasured latent variable analysis
[11]. The average variance explained by the method
unmeasured latent variable was only 0.54%, providing
evidence that the sample does not suffer from harmful
CMV.
6. Discussion
The overriding goal of this research is to explore 
the relationship of RFT and RCT in motivating 
insiders’ protection of organizational information 
assets. Prior studies have examined both; however, 
these previous works did not examine RFT and RCT 
in concert. Because of RFT's consideration of 
promotion and prevention foci, it is worth 
investigating how these orientations influence the 
perceptions of the relative costs and benefits of 
protecting information assets. This is true because 
while promotion and prevention are both motivational 
paradigms, they each disparately reflect insiders' focus 
on achievement (promotion) or security (prevention) 
[31, 41]. Thus, RCT's delineation of costs and benefits 
is especially relevant for RFT.   
The exploratory study results show that promotion 
focus and prevention focus distinctly influence the 
perceptions of benefits and costs. Interestingly, we 
expected that a promotion focus would be more 
oriented toward benefits and a prevention focus more 
oriented toward costs. However, as we detail next, our 
results tell a more nuanced story.  
In terms of the relationship between the facets of 
RFT and RCT, two important differences emerge. 
First, promotion focus was positively related to the 
cost of not protecting and negatively associated with 
the benefit of not protecting. This finding was 
intriguing because both RCT components relate to not 
protecting rather than protecting. Intuitively, we might 
have expected promotion focus, with its orientation 
around achievement rather than security, to be related 
to benefits rather than costs.  
Second, prevention focus is negatively associated 
with the benefit of not protecting and the cost of 
protecting. Again, this is an interesting finding 
because we might have expected prevention focus to 
be more oriented toward the costs of not protecting. 
Instead, we found that prevention focus was most 
impactful at reducing the disincentives to protect. In 
retrospect, this makes sense because a prevention 
focus is oriented toward reducing negatives more than 
increasing positives. Interestingly, neither promotion 
nor prevention focus showed a significant relationship 
with the benefit of protecting. In fact, the benefit of 
protecting was the only RCT component that was not 
impacted by either regulatory focus orientation. 
Additionally, the analyses show that the four costs 
and benefits examined were each related to the overall 
benefit of protecting information assets. Further, the 
mediation test results show that overall benefit can act 
as a mediator of specific individual costs and benefits. 
The mediation analyses also indicate that both 
prevention and promotion have positive indirect 
effects on insiders' intentions to protect information 
assets. Interestingly, they worked through one benefit 
Table 3. Significant Mediation Relationships 
Mediation Relationship 
Mediation Test 
2.5% lower boundi 97.5% upper bound Mediation? 
Individual Costs/Benefits on Protection Intention through Overall Benefit 
Benefit of Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention 0.067 0.189 yes 
Benefits of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention -0.204 -0.095 yes 
Cost of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention 0.047 0.188 yes 
Cost of Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention -0.092 -0.002 yes 
Regulatory Focus on Protection Intention through Individual Costs/Benefits and Overall Benefit 
Prevention → Benefit of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit → 
Protection Intention 
0.008 0.045 yes 
Promotion → Benefit of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit → 
Protection Intention 
0.01 0.051 yes 
Promotion → Cost of Not Protecting →  Overall Benefit → 
Protection Intention 
0.003 0.047 yes 
iBias-corrected confidence intervals 
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and one cost: the benefit of not protecting and the cost 
of not protecting. Finally, the model explains a 
substantial portion of both the overall benefit of 
protecting and the intention to protect information 
assets. 
These results are robust to several demographic 
and theoretical controls. As shown in figure 3, we 
included eight control variables in the model to 
validate our findings. Three controls were significant: 
mandatoriness of security behavior, security threat 
awareness, and organizational tenure. We included 
manditorniess and security threat awareness because 
we focused on protection intention beyond formally 
prescribed organizational actions [7]. The measures 
for mandatoriness were adapted from Boss et al. [3], 
and an example item is “My organization requires its 
employees to take measures to help protect the 
organization's information security.” The measures for 
security threat awareness were adapted from Bulgurcu 
et al. [4], and an example item is “Thinking about your 
current job, to what extent are you aware of the threats 
to your organization's information security?” 
Therefore, we controlled for insiders' awareness of 
security threats and whether they felt participation in 
security was mandatory in their organization since 
these might influence protection intentions. 
6.1. Implications and Contributions 
This research makes several significant 
contributions to IS security practice and research. 
First, our study answers the call for more research into 
rational choices [32], and our findings show that 
regulatory focus significantly relates to perceptions of 
rational choices. The overall perception of benefits 
(i.e., benefits vs. costs) subsequently relates to 
insiders' intentions to protect organizational 
information assets. Next, we consider the specific 
implications this research has for IS security practice 
and research.  
6.1.1. Implications for Practice 
These results have implications for information 
security practice. This research indicates that 
regulatory focus influences choice rationality through 
individual costs and benefits. This reality explains 
how rational focus can influence information security 
outcomes in organizations. A primary focus of much 
IS security research is understanding the attractiveness 
of beneficial and harmful security behaviors. These 
results show that regulatory focus influences the cost-
benefit calculations of protecting organizational 
information assets 
In the present study, promotion focus was related 
negatively to the perceived benefit of not protecting 
and positively to the perceived cost of not protecting. 
Thus, insiders with a higher promotion focus calculate 
higher costs of not protecting information assets and 
lower benefits to not protecting these assets. While 
both of these results are positive for information 
security, they constitute an interesting finding because 
promotion focus is typically expected to be associated 
with achievement and gains rather than security and 
preventing losses.  
On the other hand, prevention focus is related 
negatively to the benefit of not protecting and the cost 
of protecting. These negative relationships with 
disincentives to protect show that a prevention-focus 
leads to minimizing losses in security. Thus, as a 
motivational frame, these results indicate that 
prevention focus reduces the perceptions of 
protection-inhibiting costs and benefits (i.e., the 
benefit of not protecting and cost of not protecting) but 
does not impact the perceptions of protection-
enhancing costs and benefits (i.e., the cost of 
protecting and benefit of protecting). 
Finally, the research shows that while all four costs 
and benefits are significantly related to the overall 
perception of benefits from protecting information 
assets, some have a more substantial influence than 
others. For example, the benefit of protecting and the 
benefit of not protecting exhibited the strongest 
relationship with the overall benefit of protecting 
according to the beta coefficient's absolute value. In 
contrast, the weakest relationship involving the overall 
benefit of protecting was with the cost of protecting. 
This finding is intriguing because security 
professionals tend to think a major inhibitor of positive 
security-related behaviors stems from their perceived 
costs in terms of insiders’ time and effort. Based on 
these findings, security practitioners can focus their 
efforts on amplifying the benefits of protecting and the 
costs of not protecting, rather than minimizing the 
perceived costs of protecting organizational assets.  
In summary, taking insiders’ regulatory focus into 
consideration can have beneficial impacts on 
information security. As motivational frames, both 
foci were related to costs and benefits to protecting 
organizational information assets in ways that enhance 
security. However, they worked through distinct costs 
and benefits. Additionally, we show how distinct costs 
and benefits relate to the overall perception of the 
benefit of protecting organizational assets, providing 
practitioners with a framework for increasing the 
protection of organizational information assets.  
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6.1.2. Implications for Research 
Beyond the practical implications of the research, 
our findings also help inform IS security research. For 
example, we are among the first to integrate RCT with 
RFT to understand how insiders’ regulatory focus 
influences protective behaviors' rationality. We show 
that regulatory focus influences distinct costs and 
benefits. Additionally, the findings indicate that each 
cost and benefit is uniquely associated with the overall 
benefit of protecting. In fact, the mediation results 
indicate that the overall benefit mediates the 
relationship between distinct costs/benefits and 
protection intention.  
These found relationships between regulatory 
focus and costs/benefits also underscore another 
important theoretical contribution of our study: the 
expansion of previous works [e.g., 4] to include the 
benefit of not protecting. 
Finally, the model explains a substantial portion of 
the variance in both the overall benefit of protecting 
and intentions to protect organizational information 
assets. The model's robust performance indicates that 
our research provides a compelling theoretical 
extension of RFT and RCT. Notably, previous 
research has examined rational choices on compliance 
with security policies; however, compliance and 
protection are not the same [7]. Thus, these findings 
are an important extension of the prior RCT research 
beyond policy compliance to the more inclusive goal 
of protecting organizational information assets.  
6.2. Limitations and Future Research 
It should be noted that this research relies on self-
reported perceptions and intentions. However, survey 
instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining 
insiders' security-related perceptions and intentions [3, 
24]. To help counter any weaknesses from self-
reported measures, we took recommended precautions 
to ensure that individual anonymity was preserved, 
and responses were reliable. Future research can 
address this shortcoming through experimental 
methods or by measuring actual behavior.  
Our findings indicate that the overall benefit 
mediates distinct costs and benefits. However, 
regulatory focus worked distinctly through individual 
costs and benefits. Researchers have been mixed on 
their use of distinct costs and benefits [e.g., 4] or the 
overall balance of cost/benefit [e.g., 36]. Therefore, 
future research should continue to investigate both the 
overall benefit as well as distinct costs and benefits. 
When an overall measure is appropriate, our findings 
provide a new overall measure that mediates 
individual costs and benefits.   
Regulatory focus can be a lingering characteristic 
or a temporary state [22]. Prior research indicates that 
regulatory focus can be also be influenced [29]. 
Additionally, researchers have found that regulatory 
fit between an individual and a task or environment 
can also improve motivation [22]. Finally, research 
indicates that regulatory focus is shaped by 
environmental cues, including management behavior 
and communication [23]. Thus, this type of regulatory 
focus activation provides numerous opportunities for 
IS security researchers. For example, future research 
should employ experimental methods to examine the 
activation of regulatory focus and explore the role of 
regulatory cues in motivating both protective and 
harmful IS-related behaviors. Despite the clear 
relevance for IS security, few studies have 
investigated RFT in this context [30].  
7. Conclusion
This study explored an integrated model of RCT 
and RFT. The results indicate that regulatory focus 
relates to distinct costs and benefits of protecting 
organizational information assets. Specifically, we 
found that promotion focus relates negatively to the 
benefit of not protecting and positively to the cost of 
not protecting, and prevention focus relates negatively 
to the benefit of not protecting and the cost of 
protecting.  
Extending prior works in RCT [4], the model 
includes the benefit of not protecting and investigates 
intentions to protect organizational assets rather than 
intentions to comply with security policies. The results 
also show that distinct costs and benefits are mediated 
through the perceptions of the overall benefit of 
protecting information assets. However, because 
regulatory foci disparately impact the individual costs 
and benefits, the choice of measuring individual costs 
and benefits versus an overall measure depends largely 
on the goals of the research.  
Finally, the research enumerates important 
opportunities for future researchers to expand on the 
role of RFT in IS security. Specifically, as a 
motivational theory based on prevention and 
promotion, future researchers should investigate the 
role of regulatory focus on conflicting organizational 
goals. For example, some organizational objectives 
are probably more likely to be framed through 
promotion cues (“make sales”), while other are 
probably more likely to be framed with prevention 
cues ("avoid security incidents"). This research 
indicates that promotion and prevention foci are both 
relevant to IS security motivation and intentions. 
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